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In this paper I discuss the theoretical basis and development of the interest promotion, 
normative discourse, and the principle relationships of inter-regionalism as EU foreign policy. I 
then describe the histories, ideologies, and interests of the key regional bodies of the Latin 
American and Caribbean region and evaluate EU influence, focusing on the partnership between 
the EU and Common Market of the South as the most valuable to the success of inter-
regionalism as a key element of EU foreign relations. I then apply the analytical framework for 
EU activity developed by Dr. Arantza Gomez Arana, drawing on material from the EU 
Commission, statistical evaluations, news sources, and academic journals, to evaluate the EU’s 
strategic approach and identify the stances and potential impacts of the 2019 Association 
Agreement. I find the EU’s strategic position and policy as ambitious but reactive and unlikely to 
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CHAPTER 1: EU INTER-REGIONALISM 
Introduction 
Official diplomatic relations between the European Union (EU) and the nations of the 
Latin American & Caribbean (LAC) region span nearly four decades during which the continent 
has seen transformative social and economic shifts as well as crises at essentially every level of 
government in one of the most geographically and socially diverse areas of the world. Political 
life in this region has been determined largely by the legacies of twentieth-century dictatorships, 
social and economic inequality, and competing regional state structures backed and/or opposed 
by the perpetual influence of foreign powers. Since the 1980s nearly every nation in the region 
has made significant progress towards democratization through the resolution of internal unrest, 
political and social efforts to address poverty and inequality, and the expansion of new forms of 
foreign relations to redefine the historical peripherality of their economies in response to 
increasingly globalizing world markets. To serve these manifold ambitions, various regional 
organizations for economic and political cooperation amongst Latin American nations have been 
developed. Many of these groups have subsequently been reformed, others updated themselves 
in response to various crises, and several have been more or less discontinued as the efficacy and 
functionality of each organization is dependent on constant support from member governments 
and perceived viability under shifting economic conditions. These state and regional 
development projects are crafted around specific and often diverging international positions, 
ideological bases for governance, and leadership roles for the different member-states. The many 
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successive initiatives of regional organizations have steered economic and political integration in 
the region through eras of international economic disruptions and crises, each contributing to the 
scope of the proposed solutions to the endemic socio-political issues of the region, the rising 
threat of global climate change, and the urgent need for competitiveness in the global 
marketplace. 
Though the recent era of re-democratization in Latin American history has often been 
compared to the contemporaneous wave of democratization, economic modernization, and 
regional integration of Eastern Europe, partnership from the European Economic Community 
(EEC) with individual nations and the subsequent regional bodies in LAC was neither 
immediately recognized nor actively pursued in its early years. However, since the late 1980s the 
involvement of the EU in regional integration projects has fully changed course from a position 
of secondary dialogue to a complex multilevel interregional strategy with broad strategic 
partnerships between regional bodies, bilateral agreements with larger emerging powers such as 
Brazil and Mexico, and broadened civil society relations in nearly all LAC nations. These 
developments span a roughly thirty-year period and reflect the major EU foreign policy efforts to 
establish “actorness” and influence in international foreign policy I following deepened political 
integration due to the foundation and reforms of the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties. The 
partnership with Mercosur, recently redefined in the 2019 EU-Mercosur Association Agreement 
(AA), is of unique significance for the realization of the EU’s main foreign policy interests in 
Latin America due to its structure, political ambitions, and the duration of its evolution since the 
signature of the 1999 Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement. The AA, which is 
currently pending ratification, represents the absolute actuality of policy contestation as well as a 
possible defining moment for a new stage in EU-LAC relations. Along with the Free Trade 
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Agreement (FTA) pillar, the AA reflect the rhetorical interests of EU-LAC relations in the areas 
of democratic values and environmental sustainability which have been largely consistent during 
the relationship. Yet the member-states of Mercosur as well as the institutional organization itself 
currently demonstrates significant issues surrounding those democratic values and 
environmentalism which the EU has attempted to address as foundational elements of its foreign 
policy strategy.  
In this paper I will argue that the dissonance between the EU’s ambitions for its 
partnership with Mercosur and the circumstances of its twenty-year history demonstrate a lack of 
reliable functionality of the EU inter-regional foreign policy model. To this end, I will describe 
the origins of the EU’s inter-regionalism, the main examples of Latin American and Caribbean 
regionalism, and the history of the EU’s involvement with the Mercosur Common Market. I will 
then evaluate the EU’s current strategic approach to advancing its relationship with Mercosur 
through the 2019 Association Agreement. With this understanding of the sources and application 
of EU-LAC regional policy, I will identify the structural limitations which produce the systemic 
failures in its stated goals of democratic accountability and environmental sustainability. 
  
Theory and Sources 
The EU’s approach to foreign relations is considered unique to its major nation-state 
peers due to its developmental history and state structure. Though the European Commission, 
Council, and heads of the major institutions represent and articulate “EU views” of issues on the 
international stage, the foreign policy activities of member-states nearly always produce 
asymmetrical strategic relationships. These invariably lead to complications rarely faced by 
nation-state foreign policy institutions, and have led many to speculate on the coherence of EU 
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foreign policy itself beyond its proven affinity for bi- and multi-lateral engagement through trade 
relations (Savorskaya 2015). There are nonetheless, clearly identifiable interests in the EU’s 
interstate relations, many of which draw legitimacy from the organizing logic of the Union itself 
and have considerable effects on the concepts and aspirations of the EU’s international activity. 
Along with basic democratic norms such as representative government, rule of law, human 
rights, etc., Regionalism and “Inter-regionalism” appear as recurring concepts in the formulation 
of EU foreign policy projects. The former is a specific theoretical phenomenon of post-war 
international relations between many different nations which can be seen as various efforts of 
inter- and trans-state cooperation organizations in response to shifts of the world economic and 
geo-political order. The latter is a foreign relations strategy which is actively and consciously 
pursued by the EU with its own set of assumptions, sources of advocacy, and guiding principles 
like any other strategic approach. In this section I will describe the theoretical basis of 
Regionalism and its categorization of exemplary cases, then examine Inter-regionalism as a 
current of EU foreign policy discourse. 
Regionalism is identified by Söderbaum and van Langenhoven (2008) as a widespread 
phenomenon of post Second World War politics of economic and political integration by 
individual states through several evolutionary stages. These different forms of regionalist 
organizations are divided into “generations,” both for their chronological appearance and the 
notable influence of the different eras of the global economy on the representative cases. The 
first generation is succinctly exemplified by the Treaty of Rome and EEC in the 1950s and 60s 
by the alignment of interests of trade and security through cooperative bodies above the nation-
state level. Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are perhaps the most common example of this 
basic relationship as they represent a significant influence in the shape of many industrial state 
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relations. The North American Treaty Organization (NATO), the largest security alliance of the 
era, fits neatly within the parameters of a security agreement of the same type. The simplicity of 
this form of agreement lends to its malleability into whatever format a state or group of states 
would desire. Hence, the key drive behind this type of relationship is the collective interest in 
pooling of resources of whatever type with a trusted partner who by historical or geographic 
happenstance sees this as an equitably profitable arrangement. This speaks to the general 
confinement of this form of regionalism in its overall influence outside of the member nations in 
question and to its importance to the Cold War in terms of the alignment of international 
relations around the hegemons of the USA and Soviet Union. Though many large and influential 
regional projects continued to develop during the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, such as the Africa, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), and the Organization for American States (OAS), these groupings were formed and 
have remained as first generation regional groups based on their goals, structures, and 
intergovernmental aspirations.      
The “second generation” of regionalist integration is distinguished by the constructive 
political drives which expand beyond the traditional inter-state relationship into the institutional 
structures of state and society, theoretically leading to the development of a new polity 
altogether. At this point, it can be said that the foundations of the Westphalian nation-state have 
been affected as the localization of statecraft in territorial units and the endogenous source of 
interests have been transferred to constructed inter-governmental bodies of a new nature and 
representing a unique set of interests rather than those of individual state units. This is to be 
contrasted from other state forms which maintain separate and strictly representational 
institutions.   
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Second generation regionalism is historically situated as a “post-hegemonic” 
phenomenon since the major examples are theorized as having developed in response to the end 
of the bipolar Cold War-era of international politics. Rather than constructing or pursuing 
relations within wider hegemonic world structures, the driving need at play is the interest to 
construct new market units as a response to the openness of the essentially uncontested global 
market system of this point in history. This is indicative of the underlying market-focus of this 
process, for which it is often called “open integration,” based on the preference of nearly all 
major participants towards liberalization of trade and other sectors during the late 1980s and 90s. 
This phenomenon is viewed collectively as a functional portion of late 20th Century globalization 
in developing new standards of governmental political relations around the new market relations.  
 The EU is once again the main example for this form of regionalism since this process of 
“dispersion of authoritative decision-making across multiple territorial levels” is credited as the 
key function behind the development of the Single Market, the Euro currency, and the expanded 
legislative and judicial bodies of the European Parliament (EP) and the European Court of 
Justice. For this reason, it is still considered a uniquely mature version of second-generation 
regionalism and the standard against which regional integration is often measured (Söderbaum, 
Stålgren, and Langenhove 2005). Several organizations were developed during this period in 
active emulation of the EU institutional model and with aspirations of the development of 
internal markets, such as Mercosur and the African Union. 
Finally, there is a conceptualized “third generation” of integration which more accurately 
describes theoretical versions of future integration paths due to predictable shifts rather than the 
current status of any national polity including the EU. This is the most loosely-defined form in 
that it largely sketches the next era for regional integration as necessarily dealing with the rise of 
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other EU-style bodies around the world. This is a perspective of the coming “multipolar world 
order” which would see the major players of the developed second-generation type such as 
ASEAN, Mercosur, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), prepared to 
shift from internal issues of “ ptimizing political and economic processes ... toward shaping 
global governance.” This would also mean that the uniqueness of the EU in world politics would 
be reduced as other peer organizations arrive at its level of cohesion and influence, at which 
point the definitional difference of national vs transnational sovereignty and the legal practices of 
states will continue to blur along with globalization of markets. For the future of EU-
regionalism, Söderbaum (2005) also suggested the political character of the Union itself would 
enter a new era characterized principally by deeper integration by means of the European 
Constitution. In my view this is nowhere near a failed prophecy, as several elements of this 
conceptual layout have become manifest aspects of at least the EU’s institutional structure and 
dialogue since 2000. Despite the lack of a Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty and subsequent 
legislative efforts have manufactured components and functional units to articulate and represent 
an EU foreign policy in the manner approaching that of a nation-state. The Common Foreign and 
Security Policy was a key adaptation for the development of autonomous security policy 
following the Maastricht Treaty while the Office of the High Representative of Security and 
Foreign Affairs and the European External Action Service provide much of the structure of a 
diplomatic representation for the Union. European integration clearly did not end with the 
abandonment of the Constitution in the early 2000s, nor did it halt the drive towards independent 
EU foreign policies which have been enshrined into the treaties and accepted as mainstream 
initiatives and duties of the Commission. The theoretical linear development of regional groups 
and inter-regional relations as described here by Söderbaum roughly captures the prevailing 
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understanding of the EU’s relationship to other such state projects, rather than literally outlining 
those processes themselves. 
While regionalism may be used to describe the history of certain relational organizations 
of the 20th Century, its theoretical approach also contains clear normative understandings and 
ideologies which become active components of its promotion as a key EU policy. This is 
apparent in the foundational treaties, Commission-centered dialogue, and foreign relations 
initiatives which have developed a particular view of the Union’s contribution to regionalist 
integration as a method of expression of its own values and interests. Such a viewpoint is 
explicitly laid out in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union: 
 ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, 
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among 
peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in 
particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development 
of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’   
As a result, the EU’s generalized approach to foreign relations has centered around direct 
political engagement of interregional dialogue, assistance, and association agreements nearly 
exclusively through use of “normative influence” as a global actor. Many of the basic 
understandings of the EU model itself play functional roles in the pursuit of regionalism in its 
various contexts and help to sketch the intersection of ideological drives, material interests, and 
self-perception which make up EU foreign policy. 
As the European Union in the late 1990’s was approaching new levels of political 
integration and reacting to an opening post-Cold War geo-political world order, the mood within 
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the EU bent heavily towards optimism and ambition for its own capacities and place in the 
coming millennium. This was largely guided by the view that, based on its own increasing 
geographical size and economic weight, the EU must coordinate, develop, and expand its 
presence as a global political actor to positively shape the future by cooperation and example. 
The political engagement strategies adopted since then have been at points limited and directed 
by the EU’s institutional structure, but have nonetheless acted with discursive reference or 
graduated justification around this viewpoint. 
The perspective of the Commission and Council of Ministers has largely been that the EU 
should actively pursue foreign relations through constructive, impartial, and humanitarian 
assistance, as well as being coordinated with other supranational bodies to strengthen the 
international legal system. The constructive process of normalization of state relations and 
cooperation amongst institutional, economic, and social sectors speaks to the function of the 
“liberal internationalist” modus operandi of EU foreign policy. A form of “sustainable and 
participatory development,” is thought to be expressed by frontloading the humanitarian 
programs of international relations to projects of market development, sustainability, and civilian 
democratic action. By demonstrating the desire to act principally on humanitarian grounds, the 
EU reifies both its status as a model internationalist presence motivated by cooperative non-
interventionism and its influence as global actor in developing relations through norms-based 
economic partnerships rather than realpolitik-style coercion. 
This approach to achieving influence hinges on the concept of “normative power,” which 
has been contested for decades in EU discourse, alternatively being seen as a hindrance to wider 
international power, a specialized institutional-based skill, and even as a constructivist fantasy. 
Normative power as a policy approach is considered as an unquestioned strength by those who 
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credit the institutional values as inherited results of the Treaty of Rome and the transformative 
effect of the institutional logics which by their mere functioning became driving factors behind 
the post-war peace, prosperity, and democratization of first Western, then Eastern Europe. What 
is viewed as being “offered” by the EU, is a logic of strategic self-interested cooperation, 
guaranteed by multilateral oversight, and with the potential of developing multi-level relations 
through its legalistic normative function. Translating these into a set of political values and 
norms, foreign relations partnerships are clearly favored over strategic alliances and 
multilateralism is seen as the best method to direct the limited resources of smaller nations 
toward common and mutual development without the need to invest in geo-political competition 
and the “Security Dilemma.”  
Manners (2008) presents perhaps the most generous systematization of this viewpoint, 
going so far as to list the ‘normative principles’ supported directly by EU relations as: 
sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, equality, social solidarity, 
sustainable development, and good governance. He goes further to claim that the fundamental 
governing principles of ‘living by example, being reasonable, and doing least harm’ are also 
functional influences of the EU on the behavior of states, actors within them, and supranational 
bodies. This set of values, while clearly idealized and of questionable applicability, all appear to 
have contributed to the projected perspective and example of the EU in the formulation and 
practice of interregional relations and regional development as a key foreign policy project of the 
Union since the 1990s.  
As to the practical alternatives to the reliance on normative influence, EU policy-makers, 
as compared to global power counterparts like the USA, China, or Russia, have a somewhat 
limited set of tools available to them which could be considered concrete leverage. For example, 
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the EU has not developed a substantial autonomous military capacity at the supranational level, 
meaning that mediation, incentivization, and economic sanction are essentially the extent of 
involvement in foreign conflicts and the main methods for the censure of unfavorable 
behavior/rhetoric or the assistance to allied governments. The EU purposefully lacks the 
institutions, offices, and legal frameworks which would be needed to direct these types of 
authorities and resources. This precludes both an advanced state of trans-nationalized defense 
policy which would signify a heretofore unreached depth of integration and the comprehensive 
unification of Union efforts in realist power politics exercises. This is a major contributing factor 
to the circumstance that the liberal internationalist legal order has been and remains the forum in 
which the “actor-ness” of the EU is most functional, recognizable, and realized. Whether this has 
meaningfully affected or limited the military activities of certain member states is unclear, 
however it has been a decisive developmental-path for the normative-power conception of the 
Union’s interstate and market relations.  
 
EU Inter-regional relations and competitors 
The EU’s foreign policy relations, no matter how humanitarian in their conception, 
naturally serve the practical interests of the Union itself. The now three-decade-long pursuit of 
‘actorness’ on the global stage is a central goal of the EU’s foreign policy strategy and assistance 
in the development of organizations with comparable institutional structures and logics serves to 
strengthen this “presence.” Börzel and Risse (2009) identify the active promotion of regional 
organization initiatives through competitive responses of individual governments, diffusion of 
the “norms of appropriateness” on the international stage, and conditionalized efforts of soft-
power manipulation on the part of the EU among other international actors, as key catalysts to 
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the “explosion of regionalism” witnessed across the world during the 1980s and 90s. For the 
EU’s own direct relations, these legal arrangements have mostly been in the form of bi-, 
multilateral, and interregional agreements on trade (sectoral market access), intergovernmental 
dialogue, and aid (capacity-building) of various types. These agreements generally outline a type 
of priority designation, which are graduated categories of favored, strategic, or sector-focused 
tariff regimes to which national units can agree to enter and negotiate under the auspices of an 
officially initiated “relationship.” These agreements are usually structured on long-term 
projections of mutual liberalization of market access often for the span of decades. Depending on 
the type of national or transnational unit in question, the legal requirements and tools supporting 
sustainable development and prohibition of unsustainable industrial practices, such as 
deforestation, strip mining, and pollution, will be crafted to address the specific vulnerabilities of 
third-country partners. This approach is meant to embody non-coercive, norms-based assistance 
whereby the EU may pursue generalized interests of international stability, market development, 
protection of civil rights, redress of humanitarian issues, and environmental sustainability by 
supporting or assisting the development of partner institutions, civilian organizations, and market 
regulators to adopt amenable commitments and thereby strengthen the internal legal reasoning of 
certain economic and social values. This is the ideal functional process of EU norm-diffusion 
through international partnership agreements with third countries and demonstrates a key aspect 
of the Union’s purported legal-normalization process. 
Few political arrangements, even when proceeding from a common strategy, will be 
identical. Therefore, there exist several forms of interregional relationships that do not concern 
the definitional existence and structures of regional units, rather the form in which the two are 
choosing to associate. Hänggi (2000) identified these arrangements systematically as separate 
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phenomena from the different generations of regionalism types into three forms of interregional 
relations. These include relations between regional groupings, bi- and transregional, and hybrid 
arrangements. The first can be seen most commonly through the EU’s association frameworks, 
such as the EU-Mercosur, ASEAN, and other group-group dialogue partnerships involving two 
independent regional associations. The Bi- and transregional types involve member-states from 
more than two regions and often don’t concern commitments managed directly within those 
agreements. This type is more common amongst broader regional relations such as the 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and its EU relations, due to the 
inclusion of states from various regional groups. 
The final characterization of the EU approach to inter-regionalism is its functional 
departure from the “opposing” models of economic and strategic integration available to the 
actors of the LAC. The most identifiable examples around the world of feasible and accessible 
market-alliance alternatives to the EU are those proffered by the US and the China, amongst 
other smaller and more specialized arrangements. The most immediate, longest-running, and 
therefore the most consequential for the LAC is of course the US whose approach of 
“hemispheric integration” shares certain similarities with EU inter-regionalism. Both were 
developed into active foreign policy during the same world market period, involve some similar 
reforms, and proceed from the internal political culture, values, and interests of their respective 
polities of origin. However, these differences have further implications beyond diverging sets of 
state discourse or marginally separate trade sector interests. Grugel (2004) describes these as 
competing modes of governance produced by the era of “new regionalism” (which is a similar 
but not equivalent concept to the second-generation regionalism of Söderbaum) of the post-Cold 
War geopolitical order and market globalization of 1990s. During this period the US developed 
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two economic projects to reshape the regional markets in response to these circumstances: The 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992, and The Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA), which failed to achieve ratification by 2005 and is now defunct. These two 
demonstrate the influences and key interests of the US regionalist integration project in the LAC 
and will serve to contrast with the forms, functions, and values of the EU’s inter-regional 
partnerships. 
US-LAC relations have traditionally been formulated in the frame of American domestic 
security concerns due to the perennial policies and relationships based on the famed Monroe 
Doctrine of 1823. Through the continual reaffirmation of this policy perspective, the US has 
maintained that “incursion” by foreign powers into the economic and political affairs of the 
Western Hemisphere, by friend or foe alike, are to be viewed with suspicion and/or opposed 
through economic and military means. This political tradition has proven particularly persistent 
in the US foreign policies and became a major focus for the region in the Cold War, during 
which, support from socialist countries or development of those economic models constituted the 
casus belli of intrusive foreign influence. This has however, not led to a particularly offensive 
US stance against EU involvement in the region. Rather, it has simply precluded cooperation 
between the two major powers and divided their activities as separate projects. By the 1990s, the 
economic well-being of the American financial and labor markets was conferred the status of 
national strategic interest, and would be pursued by economic integration in the Western 
hemisphere.  
NAFTA was one of the first in the widespread market liberalization projects and 
neoliberal policies sponsored by the US for the LAC and the failure of the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) would mark the transition point to the current situation for the region. 
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Following the model of the EEC, NAFTA established reductions of tariffs and trade barriers, 
commitments of gradual market access, and standardizations of intellectual property rights for 
foreign investment between the US, Canada, and Mexico. Development of market access, 
especially in the domestic US agricultural sector, have since stalled, as the focus of US 
negotiators have been mainly concerned with rules-enforcement and legal standardizations rather 
than subsidy reduction within its internal market. However, NAFTA was considered a moderate 
success in its early years due to the rise of mutual foreign investments amongst the partners and 
following this model, the US introduced the FTAA as a congruently expanded economic project 
for nearly all of its political allies in the Western Hemisphere. The FTAA found a more difficult 
path to negotiation and ratification as the existing sub-regional bodies of the LAC viewed the 
limited reciprocity on offer from the US market with suspicion and found the advantage of 
liberalization less lucrative. Following the economic crisis in Argentina in 2001 and rising 
resistance to neoliberalism and US-centered economic policies from the “pink tide” left 
governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela led to the abandonment of FTAA negotiations 
in 2004. Despite the failure of its hemisphere-sized economic program, the US economic and 
political presence is felt in every LA nation and the US has FTAs and Trade Promotion 
Agreements (TPA) with ten countries in the region and the Dominican Republic-Central 
America (CAFTA-DR) group (US Trade Representative). 
The main difference of the US-led economic-liberalization efforts as exemplified by 
NAFTA and the FTAA to those of the EU, is the focus on the construction of “rules regimes” for 
economic governance rather than support for supranational regional institutions. These 
essentially represent projects of first-generation regionalism by maintaining and relying on the 
national units and legislative/administrative capacities of the participants and thereby maintains 
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the disparities of state power providing little to no mediation apart from multilateral negotiations 
and summitry. Unlike EU inter-regionalism, the US’ plans for economic relations across Latin 
America represent a generalized set of legal interests for economic governance that is 
inextricably built into its own market and political security projects. Where the EU, through its 
relationship with Mercosur, focuses on the construction of the supranational institutions with 
legal integration as a partner organization, US-led “market integration” is limited to 






















CHAPTER 2: LATIN AMERICAN REGIONALISM 
Introduction 
Latin America does not currently suffer from a lack of regionalist economic and political 
bodies. There is in fact, a surplus of regional and sub-regional groups, many of which have been 
active for decades, which have shaped the economic and political structures of the region. The 
influence and quality of EU trade and political relationships in this region are therefore 
complicated by the overlap of organizations. Broadly speaking, the EU currently maintains 
official relations with every nation of thirty-two members of the Community of Latin American 
and Caribbean States (CELAC), exempting foreign territories of European nations themselves, as 
well as with most of the regional integration organizations outlined in this paper. Brazil and 
Mexico, two of the largest independent economies, have also both signed bilateral-strategic 
partnerships with the EU in 2007 and 2009 respectively, and several members of the CARICOM 
have signed an interregional free trade agreement as of 2009. Along with formal agreements, the 
EU maintains a reputational inclusion in many LAC inter-regional market and association 
negotiations, participating alongside the USA, China, and other international powers as a 
guarantor and negotiation partner. Certain EU member states also hold unique post-colonial and 
migratory cultural ties along with centuries-long political relations. Altogether, the EU represents 
one of the preeminent international partners with nearly every Latin American nation, with 
diverse institutional, civil-society, and legalized forms of cooperation (Grieger and Harte 2018). 
The relationships between regional groupings are complicated by interrelation and must be 
25 
 
considered individually to weigh the niche areas where they exercise the most influence. In this 
section I will describe the basic themes, histories, and practical challenges endemic to the major 
and sub-regional Latin American groups, including through the lens of “generations of 
regionalism,” to outline the general state of regional integration in LAC. 
Most of the regional LAC governance models share much of the EU’s own operating 
logic, such as the basic cost-benefit calculation of cooperation by economic integration, mutual-
reinforcement of democratic values by transnational, as well as the historical and cultural links 
providing an ease of functioning to cooperation amongst the particular national units to in 
expressing their collective economic and political interests (Söderbaum and Stlågren 2005). 
However, there remain many distinctions amongst the sub-regional units that extend beyond the 
practical differences in economic integration of areas of such geographic diversity. Ayaso and 
Gardini (2018) identify three common denominators of LAC regionalism which serve to 
distinguish certain motivating logics and path-dependent political drives: differences in stances 
to international partners, regional leadership, and socio-economic imbalances. These aspects of 
Latin American sub-regional groupings often highlight key distinctions to the socio-economic 
conditions, geographic practicalities, and historical factors which are often considered as the 
practical basis of the EU’s developmental feasibility and success. Their inclusion here is meant 
to provide insight to the opposing side of the regionalist ideological calculations of EEC-era 
regional integration which form the state interests served by those cooperative agreements. 
The ideological and discursive stances which make up the worldview of regional bodies 
with respect to major international powers outside of the direct member group has proven to be 
particularly divisive set of choices in LAC. The preoccupation with the type and tone of foreign 
relations with specific nations is linked to broader self-conceptions of the many individual 
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national political cultures of the region. These are long-running currents in the political state-
structures of LAC and at different points can be seen to demonstrate a variety of forms of 
acceptance, refutation, and adaptation of the common American foundational experience of 16th-
century European colonialism. The influence of these political conceptions has extended into the 
19th and 20th Centuries and has often proven fundamental to the nationalist identity-formation 
and the political self-actualization of LAC nations in the post-colonial world systems. Along 
with the significant economic and political influence exercised by foreign powers throughout 
these last two centuries, commercial relations and military alliances with the USA as well as 
certain European powers have also determined the success and failures of national political 
economies of the region. In the context of 21st-century regionalist projects the diametrically 
opposed categories of the most famous Cold War conflicts in Latin America no longer hold as 
much explanatory or predictive power. The basic opposition to or acceptance of American 
political and economic influence, either conceptualized as a continuation of hegemonic control 
or as a resource for national development, holds a ubiquitous position in the political culture and 
ideology of every state and private actor in the hemisphere. Hence, the unification or at least 
complementarity of the ideological socio-economic projects must be congruent to give the 
necessary idealistic drive to accept marginal short-term losses or diversion of resources towards 
the community interests of integration-focused undertakings. 
The question of regional leadership is also a significant puzzle for the layout of functional 
regional units. Taken as a whole, LAC nations are highly unevenly distributed in population 
density and size. There are medium-sized countries with populations of less than 50 million, such 
as Columbia, Argentina, and Peru, as well as small Caribbean and Central American nations of 
some 20 million inhabitants and less. Mexico and Brazil stand as the outliers, with the former a 
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relatively large and economically wealthy country of 127 million and the latter as the fifth largest 
nation on earth by size and sixth by its population of 204 million. This diversity clearly 
complicates the paths of integration as compared to the EEC in its own foundational period 
where the material conditions would lead to relative equilibrium of the post-war European 
continent between France and Germany. Within the balanced situation, the trans-national 
framework and institutions were able to provide assurances of equanimity for smaller and larger 
nations alike (Ayaso and Gardini 2018). This leads to an obvious dilemma for both the continent-
wide and sub-regional units, where inclusion and/or exclusion of Brazil or Mexico may 
alternatively affect the balance of power and reciprocity in the relationship or the international 
competitiveness of every possible arrangement. While this issue is common to the division of 
ideological and discursive interests inherent to all institutions, the possible functions of trans-
nationalization of economic and political sovereignty are perhaps uniquely inhibited by the vast 
and varied geography of Latin America.  
The final explanation for the difficulties of regional integration along the EU institutional 
and economic model to form stronger regional LAC bodies is the asymmetries amongst the 
internal societal scenarios of the potential member-states. These differences extend to and are 
partially due to the economies of the region, essentially all of which are structured heavily on 
imports of foreign goods and exports of agricultural products and raw materials. This means that 
increases in internal trade, even when taken as an active effort to strengthen the LAC market, 
faces the issue of redundancy and comparative loss of revenue. This situation can be contrasted 
to the cases of both the EU and NAFTA wherein creation was formulated largely in response to 
an existing state of economic interdependence rather than as an effort to generate that scenario to 
assist a conceptualized market-project. This is also hindered by the state of infrastructure in 
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every nation of the southern continent, nearly all of which are based on coastal urban centers and 
port cities fed by extractive industries from the interior with limited capacity or use for 
development transit infrastructure. 
These manifold unideal circumstances faced by Latin American nations when choosing 
to pursue regional integration provide significant complications to these projects and highlight 
the very issues which may be addressed or ameliorated through successful implementation. 
   
Andean Community (CAN) 
 Founded: 1969 
 Members: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru 
The traditionally friendly nations of the mountainous Northwest of South America, united by the 
commonalities of their geography and democratic ideals, saw the creation of the oldest regional 
agreement of LAC in 1969. The main goals of the group were the establishment of a free trade 
zone and future regional integration for essentially all of Latin America. To this end, Venezuela 
acceded in 1973. Unfortunately, the union would be beset by structural issues and regional 
competition for decades, leading to its current diminished state. The initial stumbling block was 
the exit of Chile from full membership following the 1973 coup, bringing the number back to 
five participants. Development beyond a first-generation regionalist type of intergovernmental 
relations was stalled for years following the economic difficulties of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) in the 1980s along with armed conflicts and political crises in nearly all of 
its member states. The partnership was then “reinvigorated” in 1996 with a collective redirection 
towards the development of an internal market, perhaps more resembling a second-generation 
transnational political and economic body. This change of attitude also included calls within the 
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organization for the development of a wider Latin American free trade zone modeled after EU 
regionalism. These projects have not yet developed, and in 2007 Venezuela exited the 
association in favor of Mercosur. Colombia and Peru both have since signed FTAs with the 
USA, further complicating the market layout of the Community. Though the EU has maintained 
a bi-regional dialogue since 1993, negotiations of a wider dialogue agreement have stalled while 
similar arrangements have been implemented bilaterally in three out of the four member nations 
with Peru and Colombia in 2013 and Ecuador in 2015. Despite further complications, including 
Bolivia’s choice to join Mercosur in 2012 and the regional competition with the Pacific Alliance, 
the EU remains the second largest trading partner of the Andean Community. The history of the 
group shows both a failure to deepen regionalism in a linear fashion as well as a durability 
through adaptability to various political and market conditions. 
 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA) 
 Founded: 2004  
Members: Antigua and Barbuda, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and  
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela 
Amongst its peer organizations, ALBA distinguishes itself through the ideological basis of its 
economic and political programs which have very little in common with the varying degrees of 
market liberalism common to the recommendations for the region stemming from the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the famed Washington Consensus. This is not 
simply a group structured to oppose US influence in Latin American politics per se, but draws 
common cause of anti-imperialist resistance as a unifying tradition amongst all former colonized 
nations. Hence the basis in political traditions drawing on the ideology and personality of Simón 
30 
 
Bolívar has largely been supported by socialist and social democratic governments. In practical 
terms, the group is made up of small Caribbean nations and now only three medium-sized 
countries with historical antagonisms with the United States. ALBA’s structure is institutionally 
similar to most other regional economic and political bodies with councils for heads-of-state and 
initiatives of various market and financial projects. Beyond organizing mutual political support 
and exchange of material aid including petroleum amongst members, the Alliance officially 
introduced the virtual currency SUCRE to replace the US dollar in regional trade as a common 
exchange currency. Due to the political alignment inherent to the group, several member 
countries have seen changes in domestic political leadership lead to departure. This has the case 
for Honduras, which left in 2010 after a coup, Ecuador in 2018, and Bolivia in 2019. Amidst 
recent instability in Venezuela and Bolivia, the scope of the wider economic implications of this 
arrangement will likely remain limited. 
 
Union of South American Nations (Unasur) 
 Founded: 2004  
Members: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Suriname, 
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela 
Unasur was at one point one of the largest and most ambitious of the Latin American 20th-
century integration projects and its short lifespan reflects both the practical difficulties of this 
level of undertaking and some of the basic divergences of political programs in South American 
politics. The Union was developed in 2008 as a further step of a gradual process of top-down 
continental-scale political and economic integration. The basic concept formed out of the 
planned adaptation of existing economic and political bodies of Mercosur and the Andean 
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Community into one transnational governmental body. The Constitutive Treaty, which reached 
the requisite number of members in 2011, envisioned an intergovernmental council structure 
tasked with the construction of a South American transnational political and economic space 
modeled after the EU with a common market, currency, and independent financial institutions. 
The organization was directed by the heads-of-government through an executive Secretary 
General, elected by the member state leaders, and directed in ombudsman fashion by a rotating 
president pro tempore.  
The main task pursued by member states initially was the immediate integration of the 
institutional system into political viability from its ad hoc state in its early years. These efforts 
were largely carried out within a council structure which granted executive positions to the heads 
of government and their appointed ministers as the main provisional method of transnational 
decision-making and integration. The governmental structure included councils made up by the 
heads of state, foreign affairs ministers, and of political delegates. The early proposals produced 
during various summits sketch the interests of the national units with alternate paths of 
development as a supposed national unit. One of the first was a functional regional Parliament 
with an advisory, dialogue, and administrative role in the model of the European Parliament as 
well as standing councils for democratic election monitoring and defense coordination. The Bank 
of the South was developed in this context as a method of financial autonomy and integration as 
a development-focused concern managed within Unasur for state-infrastructure projects. These 
institutional projects were largely conceptualized as methods to strengthen regional autonomy in 
finances, economics, normative power, and security, essentially as political alternatives to 
hemispheric bodies such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA). For as long as these governing and deliberative bodies existed, the 
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implementation and construction of this polity has faced the predictable obstacles of funding and 
format of trans-national planning, consensus-building on integration paths, and vision of national 
political actors to accept.  
Progress on institutional development remained at a plodding pace during the 2010’s as 
border conflicts between Colombia and Ecuador and constitutional crises in Peru, Paraguay, and 
Bolivia increased contention and complicated the dialogue on the various projects for the 
realization of institutional structure. These tensions rose to existential crisis as the Argentinian 
selection for 2017 Secretary General was rejected by Bolivia and not replaced for more than a 
year until the pro tempore was rejected by Colombian president Álvaro Uribe. Despite the efforts 
of Chilean President Michelle Bachelet to claim the pro tempore presidency, urging that 
members not waste the opportunity for the future of Unasur, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay, 
and Peru collectively suspended their memberships in protest of the Venezuelan political crisis. 
Since 2017 there have been public discussions and considerations of formal withdrawal in 
several member states along with continuing political uncertainty in Venezuela, Bolivia, and 
Chile. Jair Bolsonaro, President of Brazil, announced his intention to formally exit the agreement 
in April 2019 (Dahms 2019). The uncertainty for the future of Unasur is great enough at this 
point for it to be considered practically defunct, at least in its current form. The Forum for the 
Progress and Development of South America (Prosur) was formed in 2019 and is essentially the 
same agreement refashioned by the centrist and right-wing governments of Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, and Peru to the exclusion of the socialist and social 





Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) 
 Founded: 2010 
 Members: 32  
The CELAC is an internationally-focused representative body for broad dialogue on 
transnational interests. This group was formed through initiatives of intergovernmental and 
minister-minister dialogue began in the 1980s following the end of the dictatorships in Brazil and 
Argentina, followed shortly thereafter by Paraguay and Chile. This reintroduction to the world as 
a democratic continent with the political will to be represented as a common group was largely 
pursued by semi-annual summits with the participation of international partners and other 
regional bodies. This began with the foundation of the Rio Group in 1986, which sought to form 
a broadly government-government association for international representation by national units 
and eventually counted 24 member states with all of South and Central America and much of the 
Caribbean including Cuba. This summit-based dialogue group developed into the main regional 
partner organization for the highest-level EU-LAC biannual interregional summits. The 
arrangement was reestablished in 2011, now under the current name CELAC, envisioned as an 
alternative political body to the OAS which has the effect of halting the functionality of 
essentially any regional integration with the participation of the United States and Canada 
(Segovia 2013). CELAC entered into formal partnership with the EU in 2013 and has since 
created foundations and political summits on topics including trans-Atlantic civil society 
relations, investment, business development and academic exchange programs amongst others. 
As a non-trade, non-political, and non-governmental body, CELAC’s ambitions represent a 





 Founded: 2012  
Members: Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru 
The Pacific Alliance is one of the more straightforward modern market-integration regional 
schemes in Latin America. As a trading bloc of only four states, three of which are contiguous 
within the same hemisphere, the “Pacific Arch” of economic market integration on “open 
regionalism” terms represents a notably simpler project than most others described here. This 
trade alliance is explicitly geared towards the facilitation of economic development and 
international competitiveness through a collective push of trade liberalization towards Pacific 
and Asian markets as well as the unification of all national financial markets. This recalls certain 
aspects of early EU economic integration with complimentary intergovernmental bodies such as 
the High Level Group of national coordinators for issue-focused commissions, Business Council, 
Council of Finance Ministers, and an Inter-parliamentary Commission. The political format of 
this group is explicitly restricted and where most other regional bodies have at some point 
reformed themselves, added/lost members, or generally undergone an internal contest of control, 
these are unlikely scenarios for the future of the Pacific Alliance. 
 
Mercosur: Background and Development 
 The Common Market of the South (Mercosur) grew out of a burgeoning interstate 
partnership between Brazil and Argentina which developed as new wave of dialogue regionalism 
swept through LA in the 1980s and 90s. This represented a 180-degree transformation for Brazil-
Argentina relations from a state of mutual rivalry between oppressive military regimes to 
bilateral cooperation between civilian-led democracies. The new common market project was 
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therefore intended as a transformative political program to shape the political future of the 
Southern Cone by adapting regional socio-economic projects into new sources of legitimacy, 
thereby reclaiming the status of internationally-recognized modern legal societies as well as 
functionally adapting to new market forces. As a result, democratic legitimacy and humanitarian 
interests took center stage as key rhetorical and institutional focuses in the conceptualization and 
development of the new market project. The choice to imitate the EU economic and political 
model led to the adoption of the vocabulary of governance familiar to EU politics. Normative 
democratization coupled with economic integration were enshrined in the founding document as 
practical necessities for the acceleration of the processes of economic development and social 
justice. In this section I will cover the political bases and creation of the Mercosur as well as the 
early years of EU involvement leading up to the cessation of political dialogue in 2011.  
In all fairness, none of the first four member-states of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, or 
Uruguay were fairing particularly well in the immediate years following the returns of civilian 
rule. Political uncertainty, fumbling parties and governments, and high-level corruption 
stemming from the reorganizations of the state capacities complicated the restart as newly 
democratized societies. The solution of economic integration to alleviate some of these pressures 
was not itself an invention of the democratic era, as larger intergovernmental initiatives for 
limited economic integration in Latin America have dated back to the 1960s with the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), which failed to produce major results apart from 
perhaps assisting in the creation of the Andean Community. This initiative was then reintroduced 
in another economic and political era for the continent in 1980 as the Latin American Integration 
Association (ALADI). Concurrently, the countries of the Contadora Group (Mexico, Colombia, 
and Panama) were engaging in diplomatic dialogue efforts to address the multiple political and 
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military conflicts of Central America and this confluence of renewed interest and apparent need 
for transnational cooperation brought the improvement of inter-American relations through 
political dialogue and capacity-sharing arrangements to the forefront of regional politics in the 
1980s. These actions are credited as the main impetus behind the formalization of the Rio Group 
in 1986, which as noted in the previous section has proven a key point of dialogue for EU-LAC 
relations. In the context of increasing regional and inter-regional dialogue, the Rio Group would 
serve as the forum for the inter-state dialogues which led to the construction of Mercosur. 
Bilateral commitments between Argentina and Brazil to promote common market integration 
based around their partnership were then established by treaty in 1988 which led to the summit 
of 1991 that produced the foundational Treaty of Asunción. Chile, another South American 
nation having recently negotiated the end of its own dictatorship, was also invited to participate, 
but declined the offer. This treaty is generally considered a loose starting point to serve as the 
foundational document for a common market organization as large as Mercosur, given that it 
only fills twenty-five pages and establishes little more than commitment, structure, and rhetorical 
vocabularies of the project. Despite the looseness of the arrangement, the free trade area became 
active during this period and the issue of legal integration was addressed by the 1994 Ouro Preto 
Protocol (OPP) which provided mechanisms for the legal incorporation of decisions made in the 
Mercosur legislative institutions. The initial economic signs were positive, with increases in 
intra-regional as well as gross trade which drove political ambition to implement the Customs 
Union by 1999 (Laursen 2010). The relationship with the EU began amidst these moderate 
successes and would prove a key strategic component of the fledgling regional association’s 
initial economic and political projects. 
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The EU’s own interest in a close cooperative relationship with Mercosur fits into the 
formulation of post-Maastricht EU inter-regionalism as well as the transformative LAC policy 
initiatives from Portugal and Spain following their accession in 1986. Prior to this point, the 
economic and intergovernmental interests in Latin America from the EEC ranged from notably 
unenthusiastic to non-existent. However, efforts to promote social ties with former colonies for 
economic and normative political advantage as in the examples of the post-colonial international 
relations of France and the UK had proven boons to the EEC’s successes in the 1970s and 80s. 
This functional shift in cultural capital with Latin American was considered increasingly 
influential during the 90s for the burgeoning EU’s foreign policy relations. The EU’s partnership 
with Mercosur then began in earnest in 1991, with formal meetings leading to partnership 
negotiations during the first EU-Rio Summit in Brussels. Further commitments, favorable 
increases in trade, and positive experiences with official dialogues led to the “EU-Mercosur 
Inter-regional Framework for Co-operation Agreement (EMIFCA)” and “Declaration on 
Political Dialogue,” which came into power in 1994 and 1995 respectively. These established the 
functional formats, main institutional relations, and broader socio-political goals envisioned for 
the inter-regional partnership. The EMIFCA layed out the focuses of trade liberalization and 
cooperation in industrial and agricultural standardization as well as a “network”-focused plan for 
development of small and medium enterprises and investment to operate seamlessly across the 
Atlantic. In comparison, the “Declaration” is both more political and aspirational, outlining the 
desire for advancement on issues of human rights, post-dictatorial democratic consolidation, 
migration, social development, and the environment. These are to be pursued by the familiar EU 
domestic policy strategy of multi-sector input through standing Trade working groups, Joint 
Committees, and Ministerial Dialogue groups. At this point the basic format of an “open 
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regionalism” partnership focused on achieving “economic restructuring and trade insertion” 
under more amenable legal, democratic, and environmental standards had been achieved.  
The 1990s are considered as the “golden age” of Mercosur’s history as the progress 
reached during this period in internal economic integration as well as in the EU-Mercosur 
partnership have not since been met or surpassed. Campos (2016) argues that the post-1999 
slow-down has been largely a result of economic difficulties of the 1999-2001 which revealed 
fundamental weaknesses of the integration process. The economic crises in Brazil and Argentina 
effectively ended the 1990s momentum and the international economic effects of the 2008-2010 
exacerbated the stagnant fragility of Mercosur’s commitments to develop supranational 
competencies. This situation is partially due to the reliance on the initiative of successive 
member-state presidents to expand, fund, and implement what are essentially good-faith 
commitments. Moreover, transformations in the Brazilian economy, which saw a vast and 
attractive domestic goods and manufacturing market diversify and internationalize while 
outpacing its fellow member-states, brought the Brazilian presidency to new levels of 
significance in dictating the pace, interests, and ambition of integration. Whether in reaction to 
these economic difficulties or by the general reticence towards inconvenient aspects of deeper 
agreements, the pace of political integration slowed during this period. 
This unproductive situation within Mercosur also brought about the largest halt in 
progress towards a formal trade agreement with the EU. Negotiations for an Association 
Agreement with an FTA began in 1999, with the key interests of liberalization of the heavily 
subsidized EU agricultural sector and of the considerable trade barriers in the Brazilian and 
Argentinian domestic markets. These are amongst the most guarded domestic economic policies 
of each group respectively and it appears that at this point, the projected economic and political 
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benefits were outweighed by the potential for harmful disruption within the context of economic 
downturn. This is also the period in which the FTAA was abandoned as Argentina, Brazil, and 
Venezuela became increasingly wary of the economic vulnerabilities faced even within 
agreements such as NAFTA. As a result, the EU-Mercosur partnership would continue without 
formal trade negotiations or projects on the table from 2004 until 2010. 
Despite the slow-down of Mercosur integration advancing to stagnation during the early 
2000s, interest in further regionalism amongst LA nations continued apace during this period. 
Nearly all of the other intergovernmental organizations highlighted in this paper were founded 
after 2000. This is indicative of the influence of governmental market solutions trending towards 
regional integration from the 1990s and into the 2000s. This trend also holds for existing bodies 
as Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Suriname all joined as associate 
members of Mercosur, and both Venezuela and Bolivia pursued and achieved graduated levels of 
accession to the economic union in 2013 and 2015. These were not wholly uncontroversial 
amongst the member-states as Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay all demonstrated significant 
internal opposition to the membership of Venezuela, which has been something of a bête noire of 
the right-wing and conservative political groups in each of these countries. Beyond the charges 
of undemocratic behavior leveled consistently against the Maduro government, many 
conservatives and even centrist groups opposed the economic structure and relations, particularly 
those favorable to Cuba, and the whole political project of opposition to US influence as harmful 
and misguided. Moreover, Venezuela’s accession was only achieved in 2013 due to Paraguay’s 
possible veto power being nullified by its own suspension following President Fernando Lugo’s 
impeachment in 2012. However, Venezuela would become the second case of member 
suspension from the group as in 2016 the heads of state of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and 
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Uruguay first notified President Nicolás Maduro of his nation’s failure to “adopt all the 
membership rules and treaties,” and have proceeded with this status since then. The expulsion 
took place before Venezuela was to assume the rotating presidency in September of that year and 
is linked to the replacement of “pink-tide” governments in Argentina and Brazil by center-right 
leaders in the early 2010s (BBC 2016). Bolivia has also seen progress on its full membership 
seemingly indefinitely suspended due to years of delays within the Brazilian congress, and 
further complicated by electoral disputes following the 2019 presidential election. These internal 
conflicts have, over time, transformed into more complex division of political interests within 
Mercosur member-states and contribute significantly to the parameters of the internal debate in 
2019, which I will return to in the next section.  
During this interim on trade negotiations, the EU-Mercosur partnership continued 
alongside the general lines of EU-LAC relations with active participation on a number of key 
transnational issues. The 2008 EU-Mercosur summit in Lima is exemplary of this shifted focus, 
as it produced a bi-regional commitment to share capacities and resources towards 
science/technology, infrastructure, and renewable energy. The EU did continue to support 
Mercosur political integration, although often as a secondary initiative to strategic market 
development. The 2007-2013 EU-Mercosur Regional Strategy paper fits this pattern exactly, 
allocating 17 million euro in total, 2 for the development of bio-technologies in Mercosur 
countries, a strategic interest of the Mercosur negotiating delegation, and 15 for preparation for 
implementation of a future association agreement (Gomez 2017). During this period, the EU’s 
interest in facilitation of further trade relations continued, albeit under Mercosur’s loosening 




Conditions and political realities within Mercosur have in total, trended away from 
consolidation of the market project in the recent decades. Though internal trade increased 
significantly in the 1990’s and early 2000s, it still only represents a fraction of GDP compared to 
external trade. This perpetuates some of the key difficulties in developing EU-style market 
conditions as noted in earlier sections. Moreover, “politically negotiated exceptions to the bloc’s 
rules [have become] the norm” as every member-state has at this point permitted a significant 
lenience on tariff uniformity to take hold (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). Domestic 
politics in the Mercosur have also been tumultuous in recent years. Brazil has seen long-running 
corruption investigations bring about the prosecution of major political figures as well as the 
impeachment of former-President Dilma Rousseff in 2017 along with economic contraction and 
monetary crises. Meanwhile, Argentina has sought IMF relief to the tune of $50 billion following 
years of economic recession. The political consequences of these crises have significantly shaped 
the landscape of domestic politics and trade relations for Mercosur at the current date.  
Negotiations for the EU-Mercosur restarted in earnest in 2010, now in an international 
market significantly affected by the 2008-2010 crises and with a transformed EU following 
Enlargement in 2004. The resultant Association Agreement, produced in 2019, will be the topic 












CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS 
Analytical Framework for EU influence 
 I will use an analytical method developed by Dr. Arantza Gomez Arana in The European 
Union’s policy towards Mercosur: Responsive not strategic (2017) to evaluate the EU’s behavior 
and changing political strategies in the negotiations, current status, and possible implications of 
the EU-Mercosur AA which was completed in 2019 and has not yet been ratified. I will employ 
Gomez’ dependent variable of engagement, measured by the independent variables of ambition 
and commitment and apply them to several of the justifications of EU international relations 
literature, including the global aspirations of EU inter-regionalism, the efforts of counter-
balancing regional US influence in LAC, and the desired role for the EU as an external federator 
in promoting Mercosur’s political integration. These drives will be tested as positively or 
negatively correlated to the developments in the material conditions of the key policy areas of 
the EU-Mercosur relationship. This will determine the extent of their functionality as policy 
motivations to identify the key interests behind the 2019 EU-Mercosur Association Agreement 
and to weigh the desired results and rhetorical claims against the relevant provisions to the areas 
of democratic governance and environmental protection.  
 In this analytical framework, ambition as an independent variable represents the 
“aspiration, desire, and purpose” of a position or desired policy and will be used to describe 
“how far the EU is willing to go to change the status quo” through this agreement. The main 
objects of analysis for this variable are EU policy pronouncements, negotiating mandates, plans 
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for the future of the relationship, and promises to Mercosur. Commitment can then be assessed 
through “obligations and intentions,” meaning the “amount that the EU is willing to pay in order 
to achieve those objectives.” The indicators for this variable are the frequency of meetings given 
by the EU (official, ministerial or head of state level), the amount of aid or funding provided by 
the EU for the different aspects that compound the relationship, and the willingness to 
compromise during negotiations. Gomez links these two factors to identify the form of strategic 
activity as either proactive or reactive. The absence of commitment may indicate the influence of 
response to other activities or circumstances as the main factor. Finally, the absence or non-
existence of a functioning strategy on the part of the EU is necessary to describe the current 
situation and the EU’s responses to it. 
  
Ambition will be measured on different levels as follows: 
 
Top: 
• Offers of negotiations mandates or agreements 
• EU official policy pronouncements 
• Promises to Mercosur 




• EU official policy pronouncements 
• Promises to Mercosur 
• Plans for a potential relationship 
Medium: 
• Promises to Mercosur 
• Plans for a potential relationship 
Low: 
• Plans for a potential relationship 
 
None: 
• The EU does not have any intention to do anything for Mercosur, the EU will not 
shift from its status quo 
 
Once ambition is measured, the analysis will move to the second criterion, commitment. 
 







• Independence, prioritization of negotiations over other agreements/negotiations 
• Substantial content of agreements and of offers during the negotiations 
• Aid, funding, or technical help provided by the EU 
• Meetings either official or unofficial at any level: civil servant level, ministerial 
level and/or head of state level. 
High: 
• Substantial content of agreements and of offers during the negotiations 
• Aid, funding, or technical help provided by the EU 
• Meetings either official or unofficial at any level: civil servant level, ministerial 




• Aid, funding, or technical help provided by the EU 
• Meetings either official or unofficial at any level: civil servant level, ministerial 
level and/or head of state level. 
Low: 
• Meetings either official or unofficial at any level: civil servant level, ministerial 
level and/or head of state level. 
None: 
• The EU does nothing for Mercosur; there are no or almost no meetings and/or 
funding 
 
The EU’s level of engagement will then be described by the combination of the two categories, 
for example low engagement and high ambition would be a possible observed outcome. The 
engagement will then be considered against the identified interests of democratic assurance and 





Original evaluation and “Third stage” of EU-Mercosur Relationship 
 In The European Union’s policy towards Mercosur: Responsive not strategic (2017), 
Gomez advances the argument that the EU-Mercosur partnership in all its political and economic 
forms has become the focal point of EU-LAC relations in the 21st Century. As such, her analysis 
places the current status of EU-LAC relations in a staged developmental process, with the first 
beginning with the 1986 accession of Spain and Portugal to the Union and the accompanying 
pronouncements to seek deeper relations with LAC. The first stage was characterized by 
standard political dialogue with the EU, and the second by deeper economic and inter-regional 
governmental relations and cooperation in various policy sectors. As of 2017, Gomez considered 
the partnership to be in the second stage under the Framework Agreement as the troubled 
negotiations wouldn’t produce the possible third stage document until 2019. With the analytical 
framework of strategic interest, Gomez noted a general rise in ambition from low in 1986, 
moderate in 1995 (the second stage) and high in the negotiations from 2004-2017. The EU 
simply did not expect much from its initial overtures towards LAC, and the creation of Mercosur 
coincided with a new interest and opportunity for inter-regional relations. Commitment measured 
at the first stage is low, due to the limited content and relational structure in those dialogue 
agreements. During the “golden years” of Mercosur commitment reached high as the Framework 
Agreement of 1996 produced multi-sector cooperation and recognizable inter-regional relations. 
Following this point, commitment is viewed as remaining high on the EU’s part, due to the 
continued interest of preferential and free trade agreements during negotiations.  
 In the next section I will evaluate the current state and major influences on the EU’s 
goals, behavior, and strategic approach through the text, policy implications, and current political 
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 The status quo must be defined in order to contrast the degree of change envisioned in the 
policy proposals. The principle concern of this agreement is the reform of trade relations, tariffs, 
and trade barriers to maintain the relative volume, importance, and preferential status of the EU-
Mercosur trade relationship. The conceptualization of the current status sees the EU’s relevance 
as a trade partner reliably diminishing in the future relative to the United States and China, the 
latter of which has in recent years become the largest destination for Mercosur’s exports 
(González 2019). To reverse this unfavorable trend, the EU has predictably fallen back to basic 
free-trade economic policies which have been the prevailing approach of trade relations. As 
such, the methods contained in this agreement to incentivize business relations, improve market 
access for EU products, and generally increase economic activity between European and 
Mercosur private actors are a negotiated set of strategic reduction of tariffs, trade barriers, and 
tariff-rate quotas. While this approach is not without significant opposition from EU-level and 
member-state parties, key political figures, and interest groups, this “solution” essentially 
advances the current parameters of the EU-Mercosur trade relationship.  
The “ambitious” scenario, meaning the non-assumable but conceivably probable outcome 
of this agreement is the reestablishment of a significant level of cooperation with Mercosur on 
wider political issues beyond trade policy. These include but are not limited to the global climate 
crisis, democratic backsliding in the region, social inequality/poverty, and the “WTO crisis” 
which currently faces obsolescence and dissolution due to US obstruction (Walker 2019). These 
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are largely conceived of as transnational crises requiring significant intergovernmental 
cooperation for which the capacity and drive has been lacking in recent decades. Naturally, the 
material in the agreement itself only achieves these wider goals through optimistic implication. 
The agreement is crafted around the 2017 WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and relies in large 
part on the body for its dispute resolution, standard-setting, and “defense instruments.” As such, 
it has been touted by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker as a “real message in support 
of open, fair, sustainable and rule-based trade” and considered a strategic win for the body’s 
functionality and stature as an international regulatory body (Reuters, 2019). As to the secondary 
issue of climate and environmental sustainability, the EU’s press releases at this stage frontload 
the conditionality of the trade agreement on environmental protection, reforestation 
commitments, and CO2 emissions reductions in accordance with the 2016 Paris Agreement of 
which all member states are signatories (European Commission 2019). This is indicative of the 
adaptation of current sustainability standards and global attention on that issue to an agreement 
which has largely maintained the same parameters since the early 2000s (Baltensberger and Uri, 
2019). Though the agreement itself contains a chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development 
with civil society consultation and assurance mechanisms for labor standards and fair practices, 
more substantial projects and measures of multi-level environmental protection are largely 
considered germane to other agreements.  
The immediate action necessary to perpetuate the scenario in which solutions are 
achievable through these existing inter-regional partnerships, is to maintain progress, productive 
dialogue, and momentum within them. Hence, the Commission’s proposal hinges on the 
goodwill and cooperative spirit in line with previous agreements as well as new ones which may 
fairly be expected to result from the deal rather than crafting new standards within the FTA 
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itself. Given the persistence of the trade negotiations through multiple restarts and pauses, the 
substantial though not transformative content of the agreement in its current state, and the 
announcements of wider political and economic relations, I rate the ambition motivating “the 
largest FTA in history” as high. 
 
Commitment  
 The commitment will describe the content of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement in 
terms of the expenditures of the EU’s own resources, Mercosur’s relative gains, and the general 
investments to achieve the goals laid out in the ambition section. The main reciprocally justified 
trade-offs for this agreement are the liberalization, ranging from total to moderate, of trade tariffs 
on industrial products (100%), agricultural goods (82%), and adjustments of existing tariff-
quotas on key Mercosur products in the EU market, to be completed in transition periods with 
maximums ranging 10 to 15 years. This is to be compared to the Mercosur’s own commitments 
to 90% liberalization of industrial imports and 93% of agricultural goods. The impact by sector is 
of particular significance to these calculations as in the EU markets, it will lead to the increased 
access gained by Mercosur’s agricultural goods and in the reverse by the EU’s industrial 
products, particularly automotive, machinery, and chemical. Notably, the EU’s protected 
domestic agricultural market maintains its subsidies and have not been revised in this agreement. 
As a trade-off, the EU is currently offering increases in tariff-quotas of several “sensitive 
products,” meaning those of particular importance to domestic producers, such as beef, poultry 
and sugar. The disruptive impacts of all of these adjustments are to be moderated by the 
implementation timetable coupled with the expected two-year ratification process as estimated 
by former EU Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström (Baltensperger and Uri 2019). 
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Further mitigating factors for the hangout on the part of the EU are the recognition of 350 
geographical indications for EU products, as well as the food safety rules and standards for 
imports, which remain in place despite the disparity with Mercosur nations’ own food safety 
regimes. Based on the manifest changes to the EU’s own domestic agricultural market, 
moderated by a limited exchange of resources towards the partnership in this FTA and the 
dependence on earlier policy agreements, the commitment on the part of the EU is high.  
 
Engagement 
 The high levels of ambition and commitment noted at this stage of the EU-Mercosur 
Association Agreement must be considered in the context of the main interests of EU activity 
vis-à-vis Mercosur. Gomez systematized these interests as positive/negative tests to outline 
functional EU interests and considered the following as the most prevalent: the global aspirations 
of EU, counterbalancing the regional influence of the US, and the desired role for the EU as an 
external federator vis-à-vis Mercosur integration. I will carry out the same tests of these interest 
formulations and then evaluate the agreement’s influence on the basic EU foreign policy areas of 
democratic governance and environmental protection.    
 The first assumption for EU-LAC policy is that in the so-called “pursuit of actorness” to 
continually develop the EU global presence, the involvement with LAC and particularly 
Mercosur would also increase. This is proven to be accurate as ambitious development of EU 
political relations with various partners has continued throughout the 2000s-2010s, largely 
through trade and association agreements such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) in 2016 and the Global Agreement with Mexico which entered into force as 
of 2018. The EU has even maintained dialogue, trade, and civil society initiatives under the 
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EMIFCA in the absence of active trade negotiations. The EU-Mercosur AA therefore provides 
evidence of an active interest in the further development of regional relations, and demonstrates 
the positive correlation of foreign engagement in the LAC as a part of the general foreign 
relations strategy. 
The second scenario is that if the motivation to counteract US involvement in the LAC 
region were particularly influential, then notable advancements in American relations would 
drive an increase in EU relations. This supposed relationship is not supported as the US has 
shifted its stance on trade in nearly every trade relationship with the introduction of the “America 
First” strategy under President Donald Trump in 2017 (BDI 2020). Through this protectionist 
strategy, the US has introduced new tariffs and trade barriers to imports such as steel and 
automobiles from its most important trading partners: China, the EU, and South Korea. The 
Trump administration also officially pulled the US out of negotiations for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and renegotiated its most significant trade relationship, NAFTA, under more 
restrictive terms as the 2018 US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (Swanson 2020). Though the US 
remains a significant trading partner of all four active Mercosur member-states, it has fallen in 
aggregate to third place in gross GDP percentage behind China and the EU, and has not pursued 
inter-governmental trade relations with any of the regional partners since the failure of the FTAA 
negotiations in the early 2000s. As the US is no longer involved in a contest of regional 
economic governance models and has elected a general strategy of bi-lateral trade for the entirety 
of the LAC, the amount of direct US influence and interest which would contest that of the EU in 
the LAC has noticeably diminished in its ambitions and appears unlikely to constitute itself in 
another format. The EU has nonetheless continued progress on its EU-Mercosur relationship 
with the Association Agreement and as such, does not appear to be motivated by the need to 
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counteract the United States as a rival in the area. The situation is more akin to playing a 
different international relations game than competing offers on regional relationships.   
 Finally, the role of the EU as an external federator to support institutional integration of 
Mercosur as a political market project would presuppose that as the common market becomes 
more politically and economically integrated, the EU will increase the depth of its own relations 
with the group. As has been widely recognized, significant advancement on Mercosur market 
and political integration beyond loose confluence on the tariffs has not taken place since the 
early 2000s and a state of stagnation has set in, effectively halting all progress on integration, 
functional enforcement of trade standardization, as well as of most planned projects for sectoral 
normalization and technological development. Nonetheless, EU-Mercosur relations have 
continually developed, albeit with more resources spent towards strategic trade support than 
structural integration, though these initiatives have not been insignificant (Campos 2016). As 
such, the EU’s reaction to Mercosur’s lagging integration has been to increase trade and 
governmental relations despite the independent variable’s inactivity, indicating an alternative 
motivation on EU policy at this point. This finding does not discount the prospect of Mercosur’s 
own internal integration as an EU interest, rather, it indicates that the lack of progress from the 
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 These were the scenarios tested in Gomez’ original analysis used to outline some of the 
key projects behind EU policy towards Mercosur and the LAC. In the next section I will weigh 
the overall efficacy of the broader goals of the EU’s support for democratic stability and 
environmental sustainability within the EU-Mercosur AA.   
Democratization and mutual assurance of its consolidation have been noted as key drives 
behind Mercosur’s creation, yet, there is a significant lack of institutional structures or even legal 
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capacities to ensure democratic accountability within the common market. Though the Treaty of 
Asunción references the democratic nature of the project, a “democracy clause” to membership 
was only formalized with the Ushuaia protocol of 1998, following a military coup in 1996 in 
Paraguay. As has been noted, the next two decades of Mercosur’s history included the 
acceptance and rejection of Venezuela on these democratic standards, the stagnation of common 
market functions, and the incapacity of the parliamentary body to drive integration. As such, no 
real change has taken place in the nominal status Mercosur’s functions to promote democracy. 
For the EU’s part, the EMIFCA recognized democratic principles and human rights as the 
“essential element” of the relationship, yet mainly provided for inter-institutional cooperation 
largely focused on the development of market insertion through standardizations of legal and 
trade practices with little involvement in democratic consolidation. This follows a common 
thread of political non-intervention from the EU which has functioned from the initial intention 
in 1999 to eventually form political relations through an AA, yet in the meantime has privileged 
strategic trade and market assistance even above support for integration of Mercosur institutions.  
Due to the inter-governmental structure of Mercosur, the democratic justification of 
Mercosur membership may only be leveraged through the hands of member-state presidents as 
such issues are entirely within the purview of national governments. Despite its expressed wider 
interests for regional development, the EU’s only leverage on the questions of democratic quality 
is through the normative partnerships of strategic and bi-lateral agreements with member-states, 
trade relations, and the reliance on international commitments unrelated to the regional 
partnership itself. Through this approach, the current situation in legal accountability and un-
democratic behavior has deteriorated enough to question the coherence of EU internal policy and 
to threaten the feasibility of ratification of the long-anticipated AA.  
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Many of the objections of Members of the European Parliament, member-state parties, 
and heads of state surrounding the AA have been related to the controversial policies and activity 
of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro since his assumption of the office in 2019. As has been 
stated, Brazil is the largest and perhaps the most influential member-state in Mercosur and it also 
contains the Amazon rainforest, which in the context of transnational efforts of environmental 
protection, is an irreplaceable carbon sink for global oxygen production. Many aspects of the 
democratic order, environmental protections, and human rights of citizens and indigenous 
populations appear to be in a state of peril under the Bolsonaro administration, which has 
discounted federal support and legal protection for indigenous people’s groups as well as refused 
to halt illegal logging and mining operations in the Amazon. Over the course of the first months 
of 2019, the governmental agencies responsible for environmental and indigenous lands 
protection were absorbed into the Ministry of Agriculture and predictably, deforestation rates 
rose to their highest rates in a decade. Multiple NGOs concerned with Amazon conservation and 
indigenous rights registered no less than fourteen indigenous territories “under attack” by “armed 
land-grabbers,” by March and have voiced charges of complicity on the parts of the federal 
government as well as the EU Commission in the midst of the promotion of the EU-Mercosur 
FTA (Fern, 2019). In August, a rash of likely intentionally-set wildfires provoked a combative 
response of denial, accusation, and invective on the part of the President which in turn, led the 
leaders of Ireland and France, as well as the Austrian Parliament to announce that they would all 
exercise their veto power and reject the AA on the grounds of irresponsibility demonstrated by 
the far-right president (Oltermann 2019). This political conflict extends beyond the EU’s 
tangential relationship of implied approval for the Bolsonaro administration however, as the 
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tolerance of his administration’s approach of willful dereliction of environmental protection 
brings the functionality of the entire agreement into question. 
The environmental aspect of the AA currently hinges on the conditionality of the 2015 
Paris Climate Agreement and the ‘precautionary principle’ standard in its Trade and Sustainable 
Development chapter. Neither of these mechanisms contain sanctions and it is unclear if these 
standards will remain in the final text of the agreement or whether the latter will be functional 
within a state governed by the current administration. President Bolsonaro has publicly 
threatened to remove his country from the Paris agreement, battled with environmental NGO’s in 
his country whom he accused of setting the infamous Amazon fires, and asserted at the United 
Nations General Assembly that the Amazon is the sole property of the Brazilian state and not the 
“heritage of humankind” (Anderson 2019). These represent an encompassing perspective that 
interprets cooperation on environmental issues by NGOs and foreign governments, even those in 
privileged partnerships such as the EU, as points of leverage limiting the nationalist capacities of 
the Brazilian state. Cecelia Malmström however, a key negotiator for the AA, has claimed that 
the FTA functions as a way to “anchor Brazil in the Paris Agreement,” and should not be viewed 
as an endorsement of all the President’s policies (Climate Home News, 2019). Any estimation of 
the Bolsonaro domestic political project’s impact on deforestation alone would make reaching 
the Paris emission reduction goals impossible, and it’s unclear whether the legal status of any 
climate agreement will even be functional at this time. A complicating factor is that President 
Bolsonaro is one of Mercosur’s most ardent voices in favor of swift implementation and plans to 
ratify as soon as possible (Iglesias, 2019). Simultaneously, the president has threatened to end 
the entire Mercosur relationship if the new Peronist administration of Alberto Fernández in 
Argentina attempts to amend or reject the agreement (Burchard 2019). As such, the president 
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clearly weighs the potential economic benefits from EU market access above environmental 
protections, inter-regional cooperation with the EU, or even the continued existence of Mercosur. 
For EU actors, a clear path forward to both ameliorate its partner-regime’s behavior and 
to maintain the momentum on this agreement is not apparent. The position of the new Von der 
Leyen Commission is vague at best, apart from unquestioned support for the AA. This situation 
is currently playing out in the context of the “mainstreaming of climate concerns across all EU 
policy” through the Commission’s mandate for an “EU Green New Deal,” the declaration of a 
global climate emergency by the European Parliament in 2019, and the stated goal of emissions 
neutrality by 2050 (Colli, 2019). A reworking of the FTA with newer conditionality mechanisms 
and anti-deforestation measures is not unlikely given that the agreement will not be passed in its 
current form for a number of years, yet the impact on net emissions reduction in line with the 
Paris Agreement remains doubtful (Rankin 2019). 
These problematic situations for Brazilian human rights and democracy have been 
developing over the course of the last half-decade, following the impeachment of former 
president Dilma Rousseff and the incarceration of former president Lula da Silva prior to the 
2018 presidential election. Based on the limited structure of both Mercosur and the EU’s inter-
regional partnership, the most effective official response from within the EU has been a renewed 
push for deeper trade relations through the AA. This demonstrates the primacy of trade and 
economic capacity-building as the main strategic point of influence for the EU vis-à-vis the 
public behavior of the Brazilian president as it appears that normative influence has failed to 
properly incentivize moderation or to ensure censure of embarrassing public extravagances. 
At the current “agreement in principle” stage of the EU-Mercosur Association 
Agreement, it appears that the EU is motivated mainly by the deteriorations of fundamental 
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policy goals rather than by constructive efforts to meaningfully expand the partnership. Despite 
the noted high levels of ambition and commitment, from the EU, the advancement of the whole 
relationship is at this point driven chiefly by reactivity to the worsening state of human rights, 
democratic quality, and environmental protection in the region. While the EU may find itself 
facing a particularly tumultuous point in the political and economic life in LAC, policy 
formulation from a reactive rather than proactive standpoint has become a determining factor on 
the scope and influence of the entire political partnership. These are drastic signs for the stability 
of both the EU-Mercosur partnership and EU normative foreign policy which has proven 
incapable of reinforcing regional partnerships or even exercising conditionality on the basic 



















CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION 
 EU-LAC foreign policy has largely been characterized in this paper as limited in efficacy 
and reactive in the strategic approach to its many undertakings both in pursuit of its own interests 
and in addressing longstanding political and transnational issues of the region. I have described 
the origins, legal formats, and evolutionary processes of this area of EU policy to identify its 
overall contribution to the current array of diverging initiatives and political projects of the 
national governments and regional organizations in Latin American. Through this analysis, I’ve 
isolated the EU-Mercosur relationship as uniquely reflective both of the EU’s conceptions for the 
application of its normative power relations and of its inter-governmental systemic logic 
recreated amongst another group of nations motivated by the same collective benefits of market 
and political cooperation. The complications experienced by this partnership since its inception 
demonstrate the weaknesses in its theoretical assumptions, priorities, and functional application 
when faced with the shifting and often volatile circumstances of economic and political life in 
recent decades.   
Though the ideological and structural bases for inter-regionalism as EU foreign policy are 
substantial and still enjoy a certain consensus, its sources and mandates are largely fixed in their 
current formats due to the status of political integration since the Lisbon Treaty. The normative 
power-focused plans for the long-term development of inter-regionalism often pre-supposed that 
the internal political forces driving deeper political integration as well as their economic benefits 
would only increase or at least remain consistent in the EU as well as in other organizations 
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where they were implemented. The supposed sustainability of the political and economic model 
of the late 1990s was essentially ended with the economic crises of the 2000’s and could not 
prevent the subsequent divisions of political interests and the general reduction of ambition 
around nearly all foreign political and economic projects. As such, despite the advancements of 
EU foreign relations within the same policy paradigm taken in the following years, the generally 
positive developments towards EU trans-national goals have gradually become less attributable 
to an exercise of its growing political influence. This calls into question the degree to which 
“actorness” may be achieved and exercised in the EU’s current form and to what degree the rise 
of populism and unilateralism as well as the weakening of internal Union project through 
Euroscepticism further alienate EU values from global political reality. 
For the Mercosur project, the internal ambition for political integration of the 1990s was 
all but ended with the economic and political crises of the early 2000s in the major states. Since 
this point, a unified vision amongst the member-states has been all but impossible to achieve 
amidst the stark divergences in socio-economic plans of national governments, further economic 
and political crises, and the successive accessions and removals of controversial state partners. In 
this context, the Mercosur institutional structure has proven incapable of either enforcing 
common economic policy or of even resolving inter-state trade disputes, let alone safeguarding 
the democratic accountability and rule of law against high-level political corruption, malaise, and 
populist nationalistic obstruction. 
The practical application of inter-regionalism in the EU-Mercosur relationship has mainly 
produced a convoluted set of inter-governmental relationships with limited direct influence on 
state behavior and few of the political functionalities expected from regional organizations. 
Nonetheless, this unenviable situation has not significantly reduced the wider goals envisioned 
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for the partnership by the EU, as evidenced by the progress on the EU-Mercosur Association 
Agreement which would fulfill an official policy goal of nearly two decades. In this area, I 
believe the Union’s ability to transmute its own historical achievements to select nations through 
cooperation and trade are often simply overestimated due to the complications of economic 
development, member-state socio-political projects, and competing foreign relations models in 
Latin America & the Caribbean. The political relationship is nonetheless at critical juncture with 
the Association Agreement and the impact of its success or failure will determine whether the 
EU achieves a deeply flawed advancement of its agenda with one of its oldest partner 
organizations or if the ambitions of its global outreach will become even more alienated and 
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